Time to Decide on French Agriculture by Bureau, Jean-Christophe et al.
Time to Decide on French Agriculture
Jean-Christophe Bureau, Lionel Fontagne´, Se´bastien Jean
To cite this version:
Jean-Christophe Bureau, Lionel Fontagne´, Se´bastien Jean. Time to Decide on French Agricul-
ture. [Research Report] 2015-27, Conseil d’Analyse Economique. 2015. <hal-01299867>
HAL Id: hal-01299867
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01299867
Submitted on 13 May 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
This Note is published under the sole responsibility of its authors
French Council of Economic Analysis
Jean-Christophe Bureaua, Lionel Fontagnéb
and Sébastien Jeanc
Time to Decide on French Agriculture
D espite signiﬁ cant amounts of subsidies, the French agricultural sector delivers unsatisfacto-ry results in several respects: falling employment 
rates, partly low revenues, environmental degradation and 
declining commercial performance. The profession often 
highlights regulatory complexity and high labour costs as 
the main culprits. But also the predominantly small struc-
tures, in particular in the downstream industry, sluggish 
technical progress, unequal competence level among far-
mers, lacking coordination between sectors and questio-
nable non-price competitiveness strategies add to the pro-
blem. In this context, public policies lack clear direction 
as various tools sometimes pursue conﬂ icting objectives. 
Today, agricultural policy clearly needs to be refocused on 
key long-term objectives.
Protection of natural capital needs to become a central 
part of agricultural policy. This is both an environmental 
issue and a condition for the future economic success of 
agriculture itself. To achieve this, policy needs to be direc-
ted at ﬁ nancing amenities, such as soil quality, rather than 
pursuing uncertain objectives with undiﬀ erentiated sub-
sidies. Regulations, currently working restrictively and 
not eﬀ ectively, need to better target results. In order to 
create the conditions necessary for innovative agricul-
ture, promising biological innovations and spatial data, 
which are becoming strategic, should not be left to a few 
international companies. Instead there is a need to help 
public research direct the innovation, so that to ensure 
the compliance with biologic regulations. At the same time 
continuing vocational training for farmers needs to be 
reinforced by enhancing the role of digital tools, agricul-
tural colleges and higher education. Regarding the French 
export strategy, national agriculture should principally rely 
upon a small number of labels promoting food control, full 
traceability, the absence of antibiotics and growth enhan-
cement products and respect for the environment and ani-
mal welfare. Finally, in order to help farmers exposed to 
market volatility, measures such as smoothing taxes over 
several years, and the postponement of loan and social 
security contributions, as well as access to risk coverage, 
need to be promoted more favourably than administered 
prices and counter-cyclical subsidies. At the EU Commu-
nity level, non-transferable contractual subsidies targeting 
public goods or with social objectives should substitute 
surface-area based subsidies. Competitiveness, environ-
ment and revenue are not necessarily incompatible in agri-
culture. However, major reorientation of policies is requi-
red to successfully reconcile them.
a AgroParisTech and CEPII ; b PSE, Paris 1 University and CEPII, Member of the CAE; c CEPII and INRA.
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Time to Decide on French Agriculture
Despite signiﬁ cant amounts of subsidies, French agriculture 
delivers unsatisfactory results in several respects: declining 
commercial performance, falling employment rates amoun-
ting to almost 18,000 full-time jobs between 2010 and 2013, 
low revenues in certain activities and environmental degrada-
tion. This underperformance has a large number of diﬀ erent 
causes and cannot be simply attributed to high labour cost 
and complex regulations. This calls for a clariﬁ cation of agri-
cultural policy objectives, both in terms of the orientation of 
European mechanisms and their application in France. We 
recommend that central importance should be given to the 
protection of natural capital and emphasis should be placed 
on research, training and the safety of products.
Worrying developments despite 
considerable public subsidies
Every year, French farmers receive more than 10 billion euros 
in public support.1 On average each of the 320,000 farms2 
receives around 30,000 euros of direct payments, see Table. 
To these numbers are added a number tax exemptions and 
deductions (for hazards, investments, exemption of petro-
leum products from tax until 2016, etc.). Farmers’ social 
security contributions cover only a part of total sector social 
security expenditure, mainly due to the demographic imba-
lance present in the sector. Considerable tariﬀ  protection for 
agricultural and extra-Community imports such as meat cuts, 
sugar and certain dairy products also results in support for 
producers, not directly appearing in budgets.
On average in 2013, these subsidies thus provide 84% of 
total agricultural income.3 Livestock farming is particularly 
dependent on state aid, with subsidies amounting to 89% of 
income in dairy farming and 169% of income in the beef-cattle 
sector. Sheep farms like the ones found in the Alps are an 
extreme case, receiving around 59,000 euros in public trans-
fers while producing net revenue less than 19,000 euros.4 
Agricultural sectors and regions that display negative added 
value without counting the subsidies in certain years are not 
uncommon: intermediate consumption exceeds the product 
value, a paradoxical situation in the productive sector.
Subsidies of this size are not necessarily a problem or a sign 
for poorly conducted policies. Various diﬀ erent characteris-
tics of the agricultural sector may legitimise State interven-
tion to attain economic, social or environmental objectives. 
The economic rationale for public initiative is notably based 
on the diﬃ  culty of covering all the risks of agricultural pro-
duction, which is characterised by small businesses without 
market power and, in some cases such as livestock farming 
and perennial crops, by the long period necessary for supply 
to adjust to prices. Social objectives may also be pursued, in 
order to ﬁ ght against rural poverty and narrow the income 
gap between agriculture and other sectors. Land-use plan-
ning by maintaining rural economic activity should also be 
mentioned. Finally, the objective could as well be to favour 
public goods produced by agricultural activity such as land-
scape, highly valued by other activities (tourism), the protec-
tion of buildings and infrastructures from avalanches and the 
prevention of urban ﬂ ooding from meadows and other perio-
dically ﬂ ooded areas. In order to evaluate the pertinence and 
eﬀ ectiveness of these public subsidies, French agriculture 
therefore needs assessment according to three dimensions: 
public expenditure needs to be examined in the light of suc-
cessful or unsuccessful attainment of objectives.
Farms (full-time only)
Per farm
(in euros)
Per ha of 
utilised 
agri-
cultural 
land 
(in euros)
In % 
of pro-
dution
In % 
of pre-tax 
proﬁ t/
loss
Dairy 38,600 361 16 89
Beef 41,300 375 32 169
Sheep-goats 33,900 397 38 198
Grain-eating animals/
Granivores
12,900 295 3 49
Field crops 38,800 323 20 50
Viticulture 3,700 159 2 8
Arboriculture and market 
gardening
8,900 524 3 25
Other 23,200 340 12 65
Overall 30,500 349 15 84
Total amount of direct subsidies (pillars I and II) 
for French farms in 2013
Source: RICA France 2013; INRA processing: Vincent Chatellier.
The authors would like to thank Manon Domingues Dos Santos, Scientiﬁ c Adviser at the CAE, for her help and support. This study beneﬁ tted from numerous 
critical observations from Louis-Pascal Mahé, Vincent Chatellier, Thierry Doré and Alan Matthews, who do not share all the points of view expressed. It has 
also drawn upon research undertaken by Dominique Auverlot at France Stratégie.
1 See Commission des comptes de l’agriculture de la nation (CCAN) (2015): Les concours publics à l’agriculture en 2014, ministère de l’Agriculture, de 
l’Agroalimentaire et de la Forêt, CCAN Meeting of 3rd July. Here we count subsidies directly received by agricultural producers and not the ﬁ nancing of 
operations that beneﬁ t them indirectly.
2 The general agricultural census (Recensement général de l’agriculture) for 2010 mentions 514,694 farms. However, operations of one hectare or only ten hives 
are counted as farms. Here we count the 320,000 farms that are actually professional (INSEE “medium and large” category). Considering that the latter 70% 
of beneﬁ ciaries receive 97% of subsidies –European Commission (2013): Report on the Distribution of Subsidies 2013–, the average French professional farm 
receives around 28,000 euros in subsidies. The ﬁ gure of 30,500 euros in the table results from the fact that the sample used (FADN) excludes part-time farms.
3 See Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The ﬁ gure comprises direct subsidies as a whole, and therefore includes “single payments” (divided into 
“basic payments” and “green payments” from 2015), agro-environmental subsidies and compensatory allowances for areas suﬀ ering from natural handicaps. 
The income is the net proﬁ t/loss on ordinary activities before tax.
4 See, Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 2013, TF sheep-goats, areas of > 600 m elevation for the Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur region. For a more 
detailed analysis see Bureau J-C. and S. Thoyer (2014): La politique agricole commune, La Découverte, p. 85.
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A contrasted social situation
Both sector-level and microeconomic data suggest that in 
structural terms the revenues of “professional” farmers are 
on average not lower compared to other sectors (Box1). Their 
assets even turn out to be larger than those of the average 
household. But this ﬁ nding needs to be put into perspective. 
First, there are very large sectoral disparities, which are only 
partially oﬀ set by households’ non-agricultural revenues.5 
Thus, numbers appear to be structurally low in the suckling 
cow and sheep sectors as well as in the ﬁ eld vegetables 
and non-AOC (Appellation d’origine contrôlée) winegrowing 
sectors. Large disparities also persist between speciﬁ c 
groups of the population, such as indebted young people and 
retirees. Second, uncertainty and ﬂ uctuations in farmers’ 
income are a contributing factor to poor living conditions, as 
the importance of ﬁ xed costs and the debt level in the sector 
mean that low income periods rapidly translate into critical 
situations.
Until 2015, France had opted for subsidies distributed according 
to individual historical references (based on payments received 
in the past). Thus, this long applied system ampliﬁ ed structural 
inequalities. The recent reform of the CAP necessitated switching 
to a ﬂ atrate system of subsidies based on surface areas, while 
leaving each Member State margin for manoeuvre.6 France, like 
seven other Member States, has chosen to increase subsidies 
for the ﬁ rst hectares, resulting in a reallocation of an increased 
budget fraction to small farms. The reform also aimed at shif-
ting subsidies from the northern producers to those of Corsica, 
the South-East and the Massif Central. At the sectoral level, the 
reform directed ﬁ nancial support away from cereal farmers to 
extensive stock breeders with large land areas and to those not 
having prior historical references (winegrowers and market gar-
deners in particular).7 Compared to the previous system of indivi-
dual historical references, which was skewed from a social point 
of view, these reallocations improve the subsidies’ redistributive 
character. However, it remains that the surface area criteria is not 
a pertinent basis of allocation regarding any social objective.
1. Comparing farmers’ income with that of other members of the working population
It is very diﬃ  cult to compare farmers’ incomes with those of 
the rest of the population in a rigorous manner. The ﬁ gures 
highlighted by the European Commission often compare 
the exclusive part of income that persons classiﬁ ed as “far-
mers”, because they have a few cows, derive from agricul-
ture, with the income of employees in industry. Comparisons 
with household income give a more reliable picture of actual 
socioeconomic conditions, but are rejected by agricultural 
organisations, which do not consider supplementary income 
derived outside of agricultural activity to be pertinent.
According to the French national agriculture audit commit-
tee (CCAN), the pre-tax proﬁ t/loss from agricultural acti-
vity including subsidies per non-wage earning worker on 
“medium and large” farms was around 27,200 euros in 2014, 
slightly lower than in recent years (around 32,000 euros 
between 2010 and 2014) but close to the average over a 
longer period (since 2000). These ﬁ gures do not primarily 
show low average income as compared with other profes-
sional categories, but rather big variation between specia-
lisations and years. The pre-tax proﬁ t/loss per non-waged 
annual work unit for producers of “general ﬁ eld crops” was 
on average greater than 60,000 euros, while for producers 
of sheep and goats it was scarcely more than 18,000 euros 
in the ﬁ ve years from 2010 to 2014. Even for ﬁ eld crops, 
incomes are very low in certain years (2009). Moreover, 
these averages mask much larger individual ﬂ uctuations.
The average income for an agricultural household in 2010 
(38,200 euros) appears slightly above average. However, 
the criterion used (“foyer” [tax household comprising all of 
the people included on the same income tax declaration] 
rather than “ménage” [tax household (dwelling) comprising 
all of the people included on various tax declarations sub-
mitted for the same dwelling] or individual) makes compari-
son diﬃ  cult. It combines spouses’ incomes when they make 
a single tax declaration. The most recent INSEE ﬁ gures, like 
those of the Observatoire des inégalités (Observatory of 
Inequalities), do not distinguish between sectors of acti-
vity. Although they locate serious poverty in urban areas, 
and particularly in Île-de-France, rural departments are not 
exempt (Pyrénées-Orientales and Creuse).
Comparisons of assets show that, at the same income 
and age, farmers have much higher gross private assets 
than those of other households (in the average farming 
household, gross professional assets are estimated at 
213,000 euros and private assets at 275,000 euros). 
Farmers are also more indebted but, at 260,000 euros, 
their average net assets remain much higher than the 
assets of households as a whole (86,600 euros).a
Over a longer period, even taking the unfavourable year 
for agriculture of 2014 as a point of comparison, actual 
income per farm has increased by 4% since 2000, that is 
to say a pattern close to that for employees in the rest of 
the economy. A large part of this increase is explained by 
reduction in the sector’s workforce.
a Lamarche P. and M. Romani (2015): “Le patrimoine des indépendants” in Emploi et revenus des indépendants, INSEE Références. It is not possible 
to distinguish between the remuneration of professional assets and the remuneration of work for farmers, as is also the case for the majority of 
self-employed workers.
5 Delame N. (2015): “Les revenus non agricoles réduisent les écarts de revenus entre foyers d’agriculteurs” in Emploi et revenus des indépendants, INSEE 
Références. In 2010, non-agricultural income provided a supplement for farming households, which drew 60% of their income from agriculture. One third was 
composed of income from property, 10% from pensions and the remainder comprising incomes from non-agricultural activities.
6 For an overall description of this reform and its potential consequences see, for example, Bureau and Thoyer (2014) op. cit.
7 Chatellier V. (2013): Les eﬀ ets redistributifs des décisions françaises relatives à la PAC post-2015, Académie d’Agriculture de France.
4Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, no 27
Time to Decide on French Agriculture
An alarming environmental record
French environmental regulations, such as irrigation restric-
tions, the classiﬁ cation of areas of land as vulnerable zones 
requiring reduction in use of nitrogen fertilisers and the need 
to respect “topographical features” (hedges, copses, ponds, 
etc.) are often considered by farmers as a competitive disad-
vantage. French environmental regulations are complex and 
subject to change. Calculation procedures for subsidies and 
inspection of their conditions are time-consuming and costly 
both for farmers and for administration. This complexity gives 
farmers a feeling of legal uncertainty when inspected, as in 
most cases of infringements the violations of conditions were 
unintentional. The process of granting authorisations is slow 
and instructions are not always consistent. Although this 
situation is not agriculture speciﬁ c, consumer pressure has 
however led to sharp increases in “precautionary” measures 
by the administration concerning agriculture.
However, the need to issue clearer and more coherent regu-
lations should not disguise the essential point: today, the 
establishment of more environmentally friendly agriculture 
has become a matter of great urgency.
Indeed, environmental damage related to agriculture, has 
now reached a critical point in many farming areas and has 
sometimes become irreversible. All reports on the water pol-
lution, whether concerning ground or surface water, highlight 
the high levels of levels of contamination induced by agri-
culture, crop protection products and nitrates.8 Ineﬃ  cient 
irrigation practices, promoted by water prices that are low 
compared to what might be considered its social cost, consti-
tute a threat to groundwater in the Centre and South-West 
of France. Soil organic matter levels in highly agricultural 
regions have decreased signiﬁ cantly. Today, almost 20% of 
French soils face a major risk of erosion. The declining soil 
fertility (reduction of organic matter, erosion) makes heavier 
use of chemical inputs necessary in order to maintain yield. 
Moreover, policies implemented in France have sometimes 
contributed further environmental damage.9 For example, 
the speciﬁ c support for the cultivation of maize as a forage 
crop present in France between 1993 and 2005 was a major 
cause of the disappearance of permanent grassland whose 
environmental value is considerable, both as a biodiversity 
reservoir and for their role in containing ﬂ ooding.
Biodiversity is declining at an increasing rate. Among the well-
monitored indicators, one observes a rapid and drastic fall in 
bird population levels still considered “common” in agricultural 
areas.10 The disappearance of 50% of butterﬂ ies in only 20 years 
illustrates the more general fall in populations of invertebrates 
at the bottom of the food chain.11 Agriculture is not the only 
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ginous and 
protein crops
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and 
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Average 2000-2 13
201
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Interpretation: Pre-tax proﬁ t/loss per non-waged worker in 2014 values.
Source: Commission des comptes de l’agriculture de la Nation.
Pigs Market 
gardening
Dairy 
cattle
General 
ﬁ eld crops
Wine-
growing
8 Conseil général du développement durable (CGDD) (2013): “Contamination des cours d’eau par les pesticides”, Chiﬀ res & Statistiques, no 436. Also see 
Eaufrance (2015): “Concentration en nitrates d’origine agricole dans les cours d’eau et les eaux souterraines”, Bulletin Eaufrance, no 3.
9 Sainteny G. (Chair), J-M. Salles (Vice-chair), P. Duboucher, G. Ducos, V. Marcus and P. Erwann (rap.) (2012): “Les aides publiques dommageables à la 
biodiversité”, Rapports et Documents, Centre d’analyse stratégique (CAS), no 43, 409 p.
10 For example: 40% fall in populations in the course of 30 years for larks and the common quail, 70% for the linnet in France; and often more than 90% over the 
same period for species that were already less common such as the little bustard (ﬁ gures from the Muséum national d'histoire naturelle), STOC programme count).
11 European Environment Agency (EEA) (2013): Populations of Grassland Butterﬂ ies Decline Almost 50% over Two Decades.
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cause, urbanisation is also contributing to this decline; howe-
ver, these phenomena are more marked in agricultural areas.
Despite their simplistic character, monetary estimations show 
that environmental protection is also an economic necessity. 
Indeed, environmental damage has reached a point at which 
its economic impact is perceptible. Nitrogen pollution costs 
are at such levels that they become comparable to the addi-
tional agricultural production initially induced by nitrogen fer-
tilisers.12 Coastal tourism is one of the victims of this situa-
tion. Threats to pollinator insect populations and species 
that control pests (ladybirds, bats, batrachians, birds, etc.) 
represent potential societal costs amounting to several bil-
lion euro.13 For the agricultural sector itself, there is hence-
forth a real risk that the decline in pollinators and beneﬁ cial 
organisms becomes a factor limiting yields, which is already 
the case concerning the pollination of rape and seed vege-
tables.14 On the long run, the very sustainability of current 
cultivation systems would be called into question by this 
combined environmental damage.
Reform of agro-environmental policy is without doubt legiti-
mate. However, deciding to take a “break from environmental 
constraints” would be an economic error for which tomor-
row’s farmers would dearly.
Declining commercial performance
At the commercial level, agriculture and the food-processing 
industry historically constitute strong points of the French eco-
nomy. In fact, their aggregate balance displays a structural sur-
plus, amounting to around 9.3 billion euros in 2014.15 Despite 
considerable annual variation, linked to the cereal price in par-
ticular, this balance is almost equal to its level in 2000 when 
measured in current value. However, this apparent stability 
masks increasing disparities. Trade in French agricultural pro-
ducts and processed agrifoodstuﬀ s grew more rapidly compa-
red with the overall basket of goods, with regard to both exports 
(+3.3% per year on average in current values between 2000 and 
2014, as against +1.5% for the overall basked of goods) and 
imports (+4.1%, as against +2.4%). At the same time, surpluses 
have become increasingly concentrated in three sectors (drinks 
–essentially wine and alcohol–, cereals –wheat and barley in 
particular– and dairy products –mostly cheese), which toge-
ther contributed to a surplus of more than 20 billion euros in 
2014. Conversely, there are large and increasing deﬁ cits in the 
meat, sea products and fruit and vegetables sectors, for which 
the combined trade deﬁ cit increased from 3.6 billion euros in 
2000 to almost 10 billion euros in 2014 (moreover it should be 
emphasised that the livestock farming sector, which until recent-
ly showed a surplus, henceforth shows a considerable deﬁ cit). 
This increasing polarisation has been accompanied by consi-
derable geographical redistribution; exports have been clearly 
more dynamic outside of the European Union than within it.
In total, France’s commercial performance in agriculture and 
the food-processing industry appears mixed. France’s share 
in world exports decreased by around one third in the course 
of the period, falling from 7.0% in 2002 to 4.7% in 2014.16 
This loss of market share is to a large extent explained by 
a context in which demand growth mostly originated from 
emerging economies, which are not France’s traditional mar-
kets, and in which new competitors were established them-
selves. However, France’s commercial performance pales in 
comparison to Germany in particular, whose exports grew 
twice as fast (+ 6.6% per year on average), while its market 
share increased by more than 10%, exceeding that of France 
in 2007. Admittedly, German specialisation was initially 
more favourable in geographical and sectoral terms (Central 
Europe and processed dairy and meat products), but detailed 
calculations show that it accounts for a combined diﬀ erence 
in export growth of around 20 percent for the period,17 which 
only represents a fraction of the observed gap.
German growth has its own causes (Box 2), but the compa-
rison would hardly be more favourable with Spain or Austria, 
which maintained their world market share, or even with the 
Netherlands and Italy, whose loss of market share was half 
that of France. This may indeed be described as a far-rea-
ching decline in market position, although loss of market 
share between 2000 and 2014 is the same in agriculture and 
the food-processing industry as in other sectors (one third 
in both cases): the problem therefore appears to be more 
“French” than speciﬁ cally “agricultural”.
12 Sutton M.A., O. Oenema, J.W. Erisman, A. Leip, H. van Grinsven and W. Winiwarter. (2011): “Too Much of a Good Thing”, Nature, no 472, pp. 159-161, April and 
Sutton M.A., C.M. Howard, J.W. Erisman (dir.) (2011): The European Nitrogen Assessment: Sources, Eﬀ ects and Policy Perspectives, Cambridge University Press.
13 There is an increasing number of scientiﬁ c references, we will quote Gallai N., J-M. Salles, J. Settele, B. and E. Vaissière (2009): “Economic Valuation 
of the Vulnerability of World Agriculture Confronted with Pollinator Decline”, Ecological Economics, no 68, pp. 810-821, on pollination and Boyles J.G., 
P.M. Cryan, G. FG McCracken and T.H. Kunz (2011): “Economic Importance of Bats in Agriculture”, Science, vol. 332, no 6025, pp. 41-42, April, on the “value” 
of the services rendered by bats for example; and research in progress within the framework of the Évaluation française des écosystèmes et des services 
écosystémiques (EFESE, French Assessment of Ecosystems and Ecosystem Services).
14 Deguines N., C. Jono, M. Baude, M. Henry, R. Julliard and C. Fontaine (2014): “Large-Scale Trade-Oﬀ  Between Agricultural Intensiﬁ cation and Crop 
Pollination Services”, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, vol. 12, no 4, May; Jauker F., B. Bondarenko, H.C. Becker and I. Steﬀ an-Dewenter (2012): 
“Pollination Eﬃ  ciency of Wild Bees and Hoverﬂ ies Provided to Oilseed Rape”, Agricultural and Forest Entomology, vol. 14, no 1, pp. 81-87 provide evidence 
of this kind, as does research on the Syngenta experimental farms which ﬁ nd higher yields when the number of pollinators is increased. Breeze T.D., 
B.E. Vaissière, R. Bommarco, T. Petanidou, N. Seraphides and L. Kozák and al. (2014): “Agricultural Policies Exacerbate Honeybee Pollination Service Supply-
Demand Mismatches Across Europe”, PLoS ONE, vol.  9, no 1, estimate that 50 to 75 % additional bee colonies would be required in France in order to prevent 
this “service” from being a limiting factor (their estimates are not unanimously accepted).
15 See Comext, Eurostat.
16 See Chelem, CEPII.
17 See CEPII calculations on the basis of BACI. See Emlinger C. (2015): “Les marchés allemands plus dynamiques que les français dans le secteur 
agroalimentaire”, Le Blog du CEPII, December.
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Reasons for under-performance
Although poor performance in terms of foreign trade is not 
higher in agriculture than in other areas, the French agricultu-
ral sector has speciﬁ c sources of ineﬀ ectiveness, with social 
and environmental consequences, which public policy should 
strive to correct. Bureau, Fontagné and Jean (2015)18 put 
forward several explanatory factors summed up below.
Agriculture in France remains dominated by small farms. 
Although, beyond a minimum threshold, size is not a deci-
sive factor itself concerning farm performance, it is tending 
to become one due to the adoption of new farming practices 
and the observed development of large-scale operations in 
several countries. Speciﬁ cally, this involves new techniques 
based upon sophisticated and highly computerised plant pro-
duction equipment, and automation in animal production. 
Moreover, economies of scale are more obvious in primary 
processing industries, and the limited internationalisation of 
French food-processing groups (apart from sugar and a few 
other sectors) are a factor of weakness in an environment 
increasingly dominated by globalised companies.
2. Comparison with Germany
Over the recent period, Germany has increased its 
share in world exports of agricultural products and pro-
cessed foodstuﬀ s. With 4 million tonnes dressed weight, 
Germany’s pork production has increased by 30% since 
2000, whereas at 2 million tonnes, France’s production 
has fallen by 5% over the same period. France shows a 
deﬁ cit in relation to Germany (France’s balance with Spain 
has deteriorated still further). Whereas France failed to 
reach its national milk production quota for 2014-2015 
(under-performance of 3.5%, against the background of 
a 4% reduction in collection of milk), Germany exceeded 
its own quota by 3.7%. It also exports more cheese than 
France. With regard to processed products, France is 
behind Germany on all the export markets, with a few rare 
exceptions. German abattoirs henceforth process the pigs 
from several neighbouring countries and then re-export 
the meat, whereas low levels of use of French abattoirs 
contribute to their low proﬁ t margins.
Several factors are put forward in order to explain this gap 
between France and Germany. Geographical and logis-
tical proximity to expanding consumer markets is one. 
Enlargement of the EU has placed Germany at the centre 
of Europe, while at the same time it made Brittany more 
“remote”, and Central Europe has been the area in which 
the gap in the market position between Germany and 
France has widened.
Medium-sized farms are of quite similar dimensions in 
France and Germany. Nevertheless, the large estates of 
East Germany, recently modernised and having become 
accustomed to industrial agriculture, constitute ﬁ rst-rate 
competitors. These industries beneﬁ ted from massive 
investment in new production units after reuniﬁ cation, 
and are more automated than in France.a In particular, 
they provide cheap raw materials for dairies and abattoirs.
Whereas the most workforce-intensive areas of produc-
tion have been suﬀ ering in France for the last 10 years, 
they have on the contrary expanded in Germany (as well 
as in Spain and in Central European countries). Figures 
on diﬀ erences in labour costs are not all consistent, but 
the diﬀ erences measured appear very large, in particular 
for low-qualiﬁ ed work. In the production of fruit and vege-
tables and horticulture, the hourly cost of labour is consi-
dered to be one and a half times higher in France than in 
Germany (respectively 12.4 and 7.90 euros per hour in 
2013).b In the slaughter and cutting up of meat, compari-
sons are potentially distorted by the massive use of “wor-
kers on secondment” in Germany, who are not included 
in employment ﬁ gures. Once this factor has been taken 
into account, the cost of labour once again appears to 
be about of one and a half times higher in France than in 
Germany.c The application of a minimum wage in Germany 
might change this situation, but agriculture has the bene-
ﬁ t of being in a transition regime and the reality of a wage 
increase remains to be ascertained. Moreover, the ﬁ xed-
rate VAT system in Germany is considered more favourable 
to farmers than the French system (Rouault, 2010, op. cit.).
Germany has used renewable energies in order to subsi-
dise its farms. German farmers apparently receive almost 
9 billion euros for their production of renewable energy, 
and photovoltaic energy.d Thanks to high repurchase rates, 
the biogas programme has expanded to such an extent 
that a non-negligible part of farmers’ incomes comes from 
this resource which, moreover, considerably reduces their 
cash ﬂ ow problems.
a Rouault P. (2010): Analyse comparée de la compétitivité des industries agroalimentaires françaises par rapport à leurs concurrentes européennes, 
Report submitted to the Ministers for the Economy, Industry and Employment and Food, Agriculture and Fisheries by the head of the interministe-
rial department for the food-processing industries and agro-industry.
b Cf. Besson A. and P. Dedinger (2015): “Réalité des écarts de compétitivité dans les secteurs agricole et agroalimentaire liés au coût du travail 
avec certains pays européens et analyse des dispositifs de protection sociale des salariés et des non-salariés”, IGAS Report, no 2015-009R/
CGAAER 14143. Darpeix A. and É. Bergeron (2009): “L’emploi et la compétitivité des ﬁ lières de fruits et légumes : situation française et comparai-
son européenne”, Notes et Études Socio-Économiques (NESE), ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, no 32, pp. 7-40, even ﬁ nd divergences of a 
simple or double order in labour costs for seasonal workforces in fruit production.
c Cf. Besson and Dedinger (2015) op. cit. and Lécuyer B. (2015): Le coût du travail dans l’abattage-découpe de porc en Allemagne et en Espagne, 
IFIP (Institut du porc), Mimeo, 7th September.
d Raoul D., R. Nicoux, G. Le Cam, V. Létard and E. Sittler (2012): “Rapport d’information sur le déplacement d’une délégation de la Commission des 
aﬀ aires économiques en Allemagne”, Rapport du Sénat, no 628, 4th July.3. Common Agricultural Policy: ﬁ rst and second pillars
18 Bureau J-C., L. Fontagné and S. Jean (2015): “Comment expliquer les contre-performances de l’agriculture française ?”, CAE Focus, no 010-2015, December.
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More restrictive regulations and higher labour costs are often 
considered by professional organisations to be a compara-
tive disadvantage for France. It is diﬃ  cult to draw the conclu-
sion that there is a real imbalance to the detriment of French 
farmers at a regulatory level. However, there are very great 
diﬀ erences in labour costs in sectors requiring very large 
workforces (fruit, vegetables) and in the primary processing 
of animal products, when compared with countries such as 
Germany, Spain, Italy, and even more so with Poland and 
North Africa.
The apparent loss of impetus in productivity gains may be 
explained by numerous factors and lack of innovation can-
not be ruled out. Agricultural producers’ training plays an 
essential role in an environment that demands increasingly 
advanced skills. This applies particularly in upstream produc-
tion processes. In this regard, France’s results are mixed.
Moreover, upstream-downstream relations are very unevenly 
organised, depending on the ﬁ elds, and less well coordinated 
than in Northern Europe: although producers are in a strong 
position in certain well-organised upstream sectors (sugar, 
oilseed and protein crops), their position is much weaker in 
other ﬁ elds (meat, vegetables and fruit).
Finally, the non-price competitiveness strategies pursued in 
France, which consist of linking quality and geographical ori-
gin, are questionable. Indeed, they lack of clarity on export 
markets, in which consumers primarily recognise registered 
trademarks instead of registered designations of origin, and 
where positioning at the high end of the market cannot serve 
as an overall strategy when faced with aggressive competi-
tors oﬀ ering mid-range products (for example, the case of 
French wine competing with New World wines).
Choice of objectives and 
coherence of instruments
Agricultural policies involve questions of great complexity 
that cannot be addressed in detail in this report. However, 
it is possible to highlight the systematic pitfalls with which 
these policies are confronted, particular in France: lack of 
clear direction, piling up of insuﬃ  ciently eﬀ ective tools that 
sometimes pursue conﬂ icting objectives, high levels of expen-
diture which do neither achieve objectives in terms of com-
petitiveness, nor ensuring decent revenue for farmers, nor 
environmental protection. The excessive importance given to 
short-term concerns and vested beneﬁ ts often prevents the 
achievement of key long-term objectives.
The new CAP enables choices
Since the regulations of December 2013 and the delegated 
acts which appeared in 2014, the CAP has become more 
ﬂ exible in terms of choice, thus leaving the Member States 
considerable margins for adaptation. In France, the national 
adaptation of the CAP was materialised in the “Loi d’avenir” 
(“Act on the Future of Agriculture”) adopted in October 2014. 
Among the areas of ﬂ exibility allowed by European regula-
tions, France chose a middle way regarding the majority of 
criteria, however with three distinct options. It is among the 
countries that have opted for “recoupling” aid. These are sub-
sidies directly encouraging production.19 Above all, France 
targeted subsidies coupled to livestock farming, which as a 
whole received a large amount of support in 2015, resulting 
from national trade-oﬀ s and new allocation procedures for 
subsidies falling under the “ﬁ rst pillar”. France has used the 
available margins to allocate payments to young farmers and 
to give priority to small farms. It thus opted for an additional 
premium for the ﬁ rst 52 hectares (to the detriment of the 
largest farms), although it did not choose to cap payments to 
large farms. Like all Member States, France was able to real-
locate part of its budget between the ﬁ rst pillar of the CAP 
(principally direct income subsidies) and the second “rural 
development” pillar (which includes environmental subsidies 
in particular, see Box 3). It chose to transfer only 3% of bud-
gets from the ﬁ rst to the second pillar, markedly less than the 
United Kingdom for example.20
A clear diﬀ erence emerges between Member States on how 
they used the margins of manoeuvre within the CAP in order 
to direct their policy, particularly concerning “public goods”. 
Some Member States, such as Poland, used all available 
means in order to limit the “greening” of the CAP. Others, 
in particular the United Kingdom, made the opposite choice. 
France is in an intermediate position. In 2014, it only devoted 
338 million euros to agro-environmental measures, less than 
4% of direct subsidies granted to farmers. The implementa-
tion of environmental policies in France is often out of step 
with the declared ambitions. Since the 1990s, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has devoted large budgets to programmes aiming 
at controlling nitrate pollution, which have been described as 
ineﬀ ective by severe reports from the General Inspectorate 
of Finances (Inspection générale des Finances) and the Cour 
des Comptes [the French Supreme Audit Institution]. The 
last programme of this type has been less restrictive than 
its four predecessors in certain aspects (in particular regar-
ding the spreading of eﬄ  uents, eligible surface areas, etc.). 
The objectives of the Grenelle Environment Forum (Grenelle 
de l’environnement)21 to reduce the use of plant protection 
19 France opted for an increase of up to 15% (the maximum possible under the EU texts) in the proportion of ﬁ rst pillar subsidies coupled to production 
(principally beef, sheep meat and protein crops), whereas Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland made very little or no use of this option.
20 However, it should be noted that some Member States chose to make a transfer from the second to the ﬁ rst pillar.
21 A group of decisions on the protection of the environment taken in September and December 2007, after a consultation phase.
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products by 50% resulted in no more than simple awareness-
raising measures, without any action concerning quantities 
or prices, leading to almost total failure of the “Ecophyto” 
plan (plan for reduction and control of the use of phytosani-
tary products).22 The “Biodiversity Strategy” (Stratégie pour 
la biodiversité) adopted by France has not prevented a com-
plicated but actually very permissive deﬁ nition of ecological 
focus areas, supposed to ensure that a proportion of subsi-
dies (“green payments”) are conditional upon the protection 
of the biodiversity.23
Altogether the French application of the CAP has resulted in 
very considerable subsidy reallocation devoted to assisting 
stock breeders’ incomes. Recently, the emphasis has been 
refocused on small farms and agroecology, although the lat-
ter element has not really found concrete expression in bud-
getary terms. However, the fact remains that use of agricul-
tural budgets in France too often resembles simple income 
subsidies, and that the long-term strategy of agricultural poli-
cy hesitates between a large number of objectives.
The piling up of ineﬀ ective and even 
conﬂ icting tools
Should environmental services be directly remunerated, or 
should subsidies aimed at other objectives be made conditio-
nal upon compliance with environmental criteria? Although 
economic analysis provides an unambiguous response in 
favour of the former option, it is the second which has been 
followed in Europe, resulting in high levels of undiﬀ erentiated 
payments, on the condition of a few general environmental 
measures. France contributed to this decision. Furthermore, 
like many other countries, in its national application it has 
ensured that almost all farmers are eligible for the new CAP 
“green payments” without any great change in practices.24 
The way in which environmental conditions are applied thus 
tends to drastically reduce its beneﬁ ts, without reducing the 
administrative burden of their implementation.
More broadly speaking, the lack of clear direction in agricul-
tural policy results in measures whose eﬀ ects cancel each 
other out. This is not speciﬁ c to France; it is a weakness of 
the CAP that has resulted from the successive piling up of 
reforms constituting so many compromises, combined with 
seemingly lost overall vision. Current policies thus give rise 
to negative long-term eﬀ ects: the volume of direct subsidies 
falling under the ﬁ rst pillar allows agricultural incomes to be 
maintained, but is ultimately capitalised in asset prices, as 
proﬁ ts partly evaporate due to capital movement (purchases 
from retired persons, equalisation payments between joint 
heirs, etc.). These subsidies thus create entry barriers for 
young farmers. The measures introduced in order to help 
young people to set up a business try, in fact, to correct 
these distortions. Similarly, by guaranteeing a ﬂ ow of income 
to producers, direct subsidies reduce the incentives to diver-
sify production. They thus encourage specialisation, or even 
monoculture. But this kind of specialisation increases risk 
exposure in matters of price ﬂ uctuation and results in greater 
use of crop protection treatments than long-term and varied 
rotation of crops. The institution of a “green payment” on 
the condition of crop diversiﬁ cation is therefore a remedy to 
a problem that was to a large extent created by the initial 
policy. There are a large number of examples where policies 
have been created in order to address problems created by 
previous measures.
3. Common Agricultural Policy: 
First and second pillars
Historically, the “ﬁ rst pillar” of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) covers all measures of market management 
(public procurement, intervention stocks, subsidies for 
exports and for non-foodstuﬀ  uses in order to regula-
rise markets). Since this market management has been 
greatly reduced over time, the budget of the ﬁ rst pillar 
thus mostly encompasses income subsidies, the “single 
payment” of the reform of 2003, which became a “basic 
payment” in 2015 and, for farms which comply with a 
certain number of restrictions, a “green payment”. These 
budgets are almost totally ﬁ nanced by European funds.
The second pillar encompasses “rural development”, a 
vague term including agro-environmental subsidies, 
subsidies for the modernisation of organisations, qua-
lity, diversiﬁ cation of activities, etc. The budget is co-
ﬁ nanced by the European Union and the Member State. 
The States (henceforth, in France, the regions) have 
great ﬂ exibility in the elaboration and management of 
these programmes. Second pillar measures are often 
subject to contractual or long-term programme planning 
and their management is therefore more complex than 
the ﬁ rst pillar. Overall, Central Europe mainly devotes its 
second pillar activities to support the modernisation of 
organisations, whereas Northern Europe prioritises envi-
ronmental subsidies.
22 See the Parliamentary Report handed over to the Prime Minister in December 2014 by Dominique Potier: Pesticides et agro-écologie : les champs du 
possible. A new version of this Ecophyto plan presented in October 2015 introduces certiﬁ cates for economy in the use of crop protection products.
23 Hart K. (2015): Green Direct Payments: Implementation Choices of Nine Member States and their Environmental Implications, Institute for European 
Environmental Policy, September.
24 The European Regulation reserves green payments (that is to say 30% of the budgetary package of the “ﬁ rst pillar”, around 2.4 billion euros in France) 
to farmers growing at least three diﬀ erent crops, crop rotation being a guarantee of smaller needs in terms of chemical inputs. In order to enable mono-
cultivation of maize to beneﬁ t from the payments despite its doubtful environmental eﬀ ects, France has allowed the temporary presence of (unharvested) 
crops between two successive maize crops to be counted as variation of crops. These green payments are also conditional upon the maintenance of areas of 
land protecting biodiversity by means of ecological focus areas (EFA). Although it is true that other Member States have done worse in this ﬁ eld, France has 
authorised crops manifestly lacking in ecological value to be counted as EFA.
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In the face of the rapid deterioration of ecosystems, the 
administration argues in favour of agriculture that is both 
more intensive and ecological. The rhetoric poorly conceals 
the lack of real direction in economic and regulatory instru-
ments. Agroecology, put forward in the recent Act on the 
Future of Agriculture, is a promising concept, which for a long 
time attracted little research. However, examples of agroe-
cology resulting in highly productive results, while saving on 
chemical inputs, are often attributable to substantial subs-
titution by labour. Yet, price ratios render this type of subs-
titution diﬃ  cult in France, unless total current subsidy bud-
gets would be used to modify the relative costs of labour and 
intermediate inputs. Neither the recent CAP nor the Act on 
the Future of Agriculture provide for measures of this kind.
Recommendations
Some problems encountered by French agriculture are not 
speciﬁ c to the sector: the size of structures, archaic relations 
between suppliers and industry, unclear market range positio-
ning abroad, higher costs than certain competitors and diﬃ  -
culties in investment and innovation are problems observed in 
other economic sectors. However, in addition to this, agricul-
ture suﬀ ers from policies with ambiguous eﬀ ects despite their 
costs: more apparent lack of coordination in certain ﬁ elds, ﬁ rst 
pillar subsidies that have become an essential component of 
incomes without any convincing logic or legitimacy and a high-
ly interventionist State, more nit-picking than eﬀ ective in its 
sovereign functions, such as the protection of natural capital 
and the creation of favourable innovation conditions.
The problem is partly European: apart from its ambition to 
support incomes, the CAP scarcely remedies the market fai-
lures caused by externalities and the oligopolistic structure 
of certain links in the chain. Yet France is contributing to this 
development. Its arguments in Brussels need to be rethought 
beyond its traditional concern with budgetary returns (all 
the more so since these returns are also becoming nega-
tive for agricultural expenditure). Within the room allowed by 
European regulations, France needs to make the choices to 
protect its own agriculture in the long-term.
Placing natural capital at the centre 
of agricultural policy
French agricultural policy needs to devote more attention to 
protecting its production capacity. From a long-term point of 
view, the deterioration of natural capital appears to be the 
most alarming factor. Indeed, it is often irreversible, and when 
this is not the case, prevention is generally easier than cure. 
Moreover, it risks giving rise to deferred costs that are poten-
tially much higher than the short-term beneﬁ ts. Although 
these costs may materialise far beyond agriculture itself, with 
regard to water quality and biodiversity for example, tomor-
row’s farmers could be its principal victims. In future, com-
petitiveness will be the result of good soil condition, ecosys-
tems capable of providing productive services and ensuring 
the permanence and resilience of production. It is important 
to assert a strong will to protect natural resources by direc-
ting all action levers towards this objective. The idea that pro-
tection of the environment is a luxury in agriculture or that 
a “break from environmental constraints” might be needed 
should be clearly rejected.
France can make greater use of its national margins of 
manoeuvre and inﬂ uence the European framework in this 
direction. At the national level, environmental policies need 
to move out of complex micro-management in order to focus 
on a combination of real taxation of negative externalities and 
results-based payments for positive externalities. Amenities 
should be remunerated rather than producers. Payments tar-
geted in this way would be rather easily accessible to those 
farms often having low incomes and high employment levels 
(stockbreeding with suckling young). Therefore, giving prio-
rity to amenities does not conﬂ ict with redistributive objec-
tives. Payments of this kind are not simple to implement. 
However, experiments of remunerating amenities based on 
performance-based conditions in several European countries 
provide serious possible courses of action (presence of cer-
tain species, water management).25
Recommendation 1. Make the 
protection of natural capital a core 
focus of agricultural policy; target 
environmental performance more directly 
by replacing undiﬀ erentiated subsidies 
and environmental conditionality with 
remuneration of amenities. The latter 
could be diﬀ erentiated geographically.
In practice, these kind of policies presuppose remunerating 
“green” (ecosystems) and “blue” (water management) ser-
vices more directly, in order to protect future production. Due 
to the diﬃ  culties inherent to eﬀ ective and fair implementa-
tion of this kind of policies, the testing of performance-based 
payments, potentially through collective management, for 
example by means of new Economic and Ecological Interest 
Groupings (Groupements d’intérêt économique et écologique), 
would be a useful ﬁ rst step. Moreover, the speciﬁ c natures of 
territories and climates require geographical diﬀ erentiation 
both in terms of methods and objectives. On the long run, 
payments to farmers for environmental services should be 
considered an alternative to ﬁ rst pillar subsidies.
25 See Burton R.J. and G. Schwarz (2013): “Result-Oriented Agri-Environmental Schemes in Europe and their Potential for Promoting Behavioural Change”, 
Land Use Policy, vol. 30, no 1, pp. 628-641 and the feedback from experience of the European MERIT programme, see Nitsch H. (dir.) (2015): Review on 
Result-Oriented Measures for Sustainable Land Management in Alpine Agriculture and Comparison of Case Study Areas, RURAGRI Research Programme 
2013-2016, WP1 Report, February.
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Creating the conditions for innovative agriculture
France’s risk of falling behind in terms of innovation should 
not be underestimated. Synthetic biology and molecular gene-
tics are among the major reservoirs of technical progress. 
New technologies enable acceleration of selection, with 
considerable implications in terms of nitrogen conversion 
eﬃ  ciency and adaptation to climate change (new breeding 
technologies: genomic selection and production of alleles 
not involving transgenesis). Regulatory obstacles should not 
condemn France to be a passive observer of innovation, even 
if the risks need to be State controlled. Spatial information on 
practices and performances (localised mass data, collected 
by agricultural tools) is becoming a highly coveted strategic 
element. Current digital and biotechnology progress main-
ly supporting forms of agriculture damaging natural capital 
(for example, the emphasis placed upon glyphosate-resistant 
GMOs). Connecting these innovations with other paths which 
are more in line with biological regulations is an issue for 
public research. In order to succeed, public research needs 
to take an interest in production ﬁ elds and systems neglec-
ted by the major private R&D operators, giving priority to sec-
tors linked a global market in which it is easy to protect intel-
lectual property (maize, soya and cotton). This presupposes 
providing the means to resist a foreign monopoly in varietal 
selection and, through the allocation of public funds, placing 
this research at the service of technical routes that are better 
integrated with ecosystems, at the service of adaptation to 
climate change and protection of natural capital.
Recommendation 2. Increase research 
into new selection technologies aiming at 
placing them at the service of agricultural 
form in line with biological regulations 
and promoting open innovation (portals, 
open data).
Modern agriculture requires a high level of qualiﬁ cation. 
Paradoxically, the most economical practices (organic, grass-
land systems, intercropping, etc.) in terms of chemical inputs 
are the most complex. Today, farmers therefore need to have 
the skills of engineers and managers. A technical leap is the-
refore needed in training. Agricultural vocational lycées (even 
if they no longer train mostly pupils intending to go into agri-
cultural production) need to incorporate more advanced trai-
ning. These institutions are small and dispersed over a wide 
area, but information technologies now enable considerable 
synergies. Digital technology requires heavy investment and 
should be a priority. While technology is undergoing rapid 
change, few farmers have the opportunity to undergo conti-
nuing vocational training.26
Recommendation 3. Make the network 
of agricultural vocational lycées a pioneer 
in the teaching of digital technology. 
Enable more advanced continuing 
vocational training of farmers by using 
individual training leaves and drawing 
upon agricultural higher education in 
order to train high-level farm managers.
In addition, it would be useful to help the training profession 
and agricultural technical institutes to develop consultancy 
independently of commercial interests and to reorganise State 
support to technical institutions in order to promote adapta-
tion to new demands (risk management and cover, greening 
of practices, quality control, etc.). Finally, it would be appro-
priate to render the various diﬀ erent actors’ actions consistent 
in order to make this advice more cumulative and make up for 
poor access to consulting in certain regions and sectors.27
Supporting competitiveness
At the international level, quality is above all sanitary and 
technical. In the food industry, reputation is above all based 
upon brand names. Although the Label Rouge quality assu-
rance label and appellations of origin enable eﬀ ective diﬀ e-
rentiation on the domestic market and on some neighbou-
ring European countries’ markets, they lack clarity at the 
international level. The guarantee of quality ensured by the 
traceability of French products is a major asset. Although 
mass-marketing operators already use this sales argument 
abroad, the absence of collective strategies does not enable 
the various ﬁ elds to beneﬁ t from its full advantage. Recent 
Chinese investments in dairies in France and exports of pro-
cessed poultry products to the Middle East, despite higher 
prices than the competition, suggest that it is possible to col-
lectively “sell” French sanitary excellence more eﬀ ectively. 
Consumers throughout the world favour meats produced wit-
hout antibiotics;28 concerns about the increase of obesity 
are international. Steps need to be taken in order to ensure 
that the multiple sanitary, ethical and regulatory constraints 
imposed by European consumers are transformed into com-
mercial assets.
26 The VIVEA insurance fund for training has existed since 2001 and devoted 44 million euros to the training of not in paid agricultural employment in 2013, 
for the most part by means of short training courses. Tax credits for the formation of managers of businesses are also available for farmers (6 million euros 
in 2013).
27 See Bureau, Fontagné and Jean (2015) op. cit.
28 A continuous ﬂ ow of antibiotics are administered in certain livestock farms as growth promoters. They give rise to the appearance of resistances. The 
European Union prohibited these “zoo-technical” antibiotics in 2006, but the use of preventive (and of course curative) antibiotics continues. France has 
made major eﬀ orts and its consumption of antibiotics in animal feed has fallen by 40% since 2007(see ANSES).
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Recommendation 4. Help actors 
to jointly promote a small number of 
labels increasing the prestige of French 
products’ assets such as sanitary 
controls, full traceability, absence 
of antibiotics and growth enhancing 
products, respect for the environment 
and animal welfare.
Current public policy hesitates between two objectives: there 
are great concerns about competitiveness loss, in particular in 
connection with the growing gap between France and its compe-
titors in terms of organisations and technologies. But obstacles 
to an increase in size and the adoption of new technologies are 
created, in order to ﬁ ght against the industrialisation of agricul-
ture. However, industrial agriculture of this very kind is suppor-
ted in the same manner as agriculture producing greater ameni-
ties. Ultimately, there is a risk of maintaining organisations that 
are intrinsically dependent upon public support, which will soo-
ner or later dry up. At the same time falling back upon small-
scale niche or local market-based farming would be a dead end 
at the national level and would leave the “high volume” market to 
imports. Furthermore, the fact of being environmentally friendly 
is too systematically seen as being associated with small-scale 
farming: in this respect, life-cycle analyses often yield unexpec-
ted results. The latter connection is not as direct as one might 
think, and it becomes increasingly less so with the high-preci-
sion farming techniques accessible to large, highly capitalised 
ﬁ rms. In our view, farm surface area does not appear to be a 
pertinent criterion in the elaboration of public policies, and all 
the more so as it is not directly connected to job creation. It 
would be better to concentrate subsidies on real, duly-identiﬁ ed, 
externalities and public goods, and on policies directly targeting 
social objectives. Farming that does not produce these public 
goods is not a suitable candidate for public support, but refusing 
the establishment of larger scale organisations would exclude 
France from an almost universal movement.
Recommendation 5. Prioritise criteria 
directly connected to externalities when 
calibrating targeting of subsidies and work 
in favour of reshaping policy in this regard 
at the European level. Do not penalise size 
increases of organisations a priori, if they 
do not give rise to negative externalities 
(management of eﬄ  uents, management of 
biodiversity, etc.). Promote the sharing of 
means of production.
Resource sharing is an alternative to the farm concentra-
tion. In this respect, the instruments of the collaborative 
digital economy and innovative legal structures deserve to 
be encouraged. More generally, the coexistence of diﬀ erent 
types of agriculture needs to be accepted –farming geared 
towards price, or based on appellation d’origine contrôlée 
(AOC) and farming remunerated by the production of public 
goods–, while using subsidies as a means of inﬂ uencing orga-
nisations according to territories.
Revising the supporting instruments for farmers
The growth of (coupled) public support for agriculture in 
emerging economies and in the United States alike leaves 
the European Union, which has abolished those forms of sup-
port inducing the greatest imbalances, in the position of a 
virtuous but somewhat forsaken leader. We should probably 
recognize this and consolidate our tools for the stabilisation 
of producers’ economic environment. Eﬀ ective instruments 
still need to be put in place. Counter-cyclical subsidies send 
inaccurate price signals and would make it necessary to 
bring product-based aid back, since cycles are not in phase 
between the various agricultural sctors. They are no more a 
solution than insurance-based systems, which are potentially 
very costly: in spite of the arsenal of insurance-based and 
counter-cyclical tools, incomes of American farmers continue 
to ﬂ uctuate more than those of European producers, which 
are highly “stabilised” by direct subsidies. Crisis manage-
ment tools at the European level are imperfect but France 
has not used all of them.29 At the French level, priority should 
be given to tax adjustment tools for the smoothing out of eco-
nomic ﬂ uctuations. Currently, some deductions (for invest-
ment in particular) give rise to ineﬀ ective tax optimisation 
practices and over-investment in equipment, which is often 
expensive to maintain. Postponement of ﬁ scal charges for 
farmers facing unfavourable market conditions helps to face 
up to temporary occurrences, without creating a major risk 
of budgetary drift. At the European level, payments for public 
goods need to be positioned as a source of certain income, 
so that farmers incorporate them into their “portfolio” arbi-
tration between certain and uncertain incomes.
Recommendation 6. Give priority to tax 
adjustment, or even the postponement 
of loans and social security contributions 
over several years as a stabilisation tool 
at the national level. At the EU level, 
reduce the incentives for specialisation in 
a very small number of crops.
29 The stabilisation instruments provided for by the CAP comprise a crisis fund and, at the same time, the possibility of putting two types of mutual funds 
in place within the framework of the second pillar: one for climatic or biological accidents, the other for loss of revenue. For the latter, subsidies can be 
activated in case of revenue losses of at least 30% (article 39, EU Regulation 1305/2013). France has not used the latter possibility. For its part, the crisis 
fund is subject to pressure for its complete annual distribution and can hardly play an ambitious role (it was not even possible to mobilise it in the face of the 
crisis resulting from the Russian embargo in 2014-2015).
Chairperson Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Secretary general Hélène Paris
Scientiﬁ c Advisors
Jean Beuve, Clément Carbonnier, 
Manon Domingues Dos Santos,
Aurélien Eyquem
Research Assistant
Paul Berenberg-Gossler
Members Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Antoine Bozio, 
Pierre Cahuc, Brigitte Dormont, Lionel Fontagné, 
Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Augustin Landier,
Pierre Mohnen, Corinne Prost, Xavier Ragot, 
Jean Tirole, Alain Trannoy, Étienne Wasmer, 
Guntram Wolﬀ 
Associated members
Anne Perrot, Christian Thimann
Publisher Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Editor Hélène Paris
Electronic publishing Christine Carl
Contact Press Christine Carl
Ph: +33(0)1 42 75 77 47 
christine.carl@cae-eco.fr
The French Conseil d’analyse économique (Council of Economic Analysis) is an independent, non 
partisan advisory body reporting to the French Prime Minister. This Council is meant to shed light 
upon economic policy issues, especially at an early stage, before government policy is deﬁ ned.
Today subsidies appear to be such a central part of incomes 
that any sudden elimination, like that implemented in New 
Zealand, is neither possible nor desirable. However, this 
should not prevent reﬂ ection on their distributional properties. 
Although the subsidies actually provide income support, with 
a social component, their current distribution is not appro-
priate and surface area is an unsatisfactory criterion. It would 
be worth incorporating a clause into the very heart of the EU 
texts, according to which any individual should not receive pay-
ments from the public budget in excess of a social reference, 
to be deﬁ ned per country, and unless these payments explicit-
ly correspond to the remuneration of positive net provision of 
public goods (maintaining an open landscape in mountainous 
areas, protecting the diversity of landscapes and biotopes, 
etc.), which give rise to speciﬁ c costs.30
Recommendation 7. Take action at the 
EU level in order to progressively reduce 
surface area-based subsidies (“basic 
payments” and “green payments”) in 
favour of budgets targeting public goods 
and social objectives. Progress towards 
performance-based, contractual and non-
transferable payments and cap individual 
payments that do not remunerate the 
production of public goods.
Competitiveness, protection of the environment and support 
for incomes would no longer be conﬂ icting objectives if far-
mers were considered producers of public goods and remune-
rated as such; and if “high-volume” producers were to develop 
technological and responsible farming. This presupposes revi-
sion of the mode of allocation of subsidies at the EU level, as 
well as implementation of policies with a long-term focus at 
the national level, such as an ambitious training and research 
policy and protection of natural capital.   
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30 Bureau J-C. et J-C. Mahé (2008): CAP Reform Beyond 2013. An Idea for a Longer View, Notre Europe, gives possible courses of action in this regard. Also see 
SER (2008): CAP Reform and Public Services of Agriculture, Advisory Report, Sociaal Economische Raad, The Hague (Netherlands).
 
